This book examines the role of financial globalization in economic growth and derives corresponding implications for economic policy. Although economists have debated the importance of openness to international trade, they generally agree that in the market for goods, international openness is more favorable to growth than a largely closed economy. In contrast, whether external financial openness boosts or curbs growth has long been a controversial issue, and it has become even more so with the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007-09.The East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s raised doubts on this issue, and helped spur a wave of empirical research on it. Supporters of financial globalization-such as Stanley Fischer and Lawrence Summers-maintained that, with the right policies, open capital markets continued to be a powerful means for enhancing growth. Critics, including Jagdish Bhagwati and Joseph Stiglitz, argued that the crisis demonstrated that, unlike free trade in goods, free mobility for capital is counterproductive for growth. In the past decade a large empirical literature has emerged examining this question. Overall it has tended to find that financial globalization has "positive marginal effects on growth." The US-led financial crisis of 2007-09 swept most of the developed and emerging-market economies into its vortex. The global crisis has set the stage for an intensification of the debate on financial openness. Some analysts and policymakers will be inclined to escalate calls for restrictions on capital flows. In the acute phase of the crisis that began in September 2008, major stock markets around the world plunged along with the US equity market, and many currencies fell sharply against the dollar (excluding the yen, which proved, like the dollar, to be a safe-haven currency). If countries had maintained closed capital markets, some may argue, they would not have been vulnerable to these shocks. Cline asserts that financial globalization represents a significant factor in economic growth of emerging-market economies. Further, he argues that a significant portion of current-day GDP can be attributed to the cumulative influence of financial openness, especially in industrial countries.This study surveys the extensive literature on this issue to arrive at a broad sense of the state of the evidence for and against the growth benefits of financial openness. The survey is critical in the sense that it seeks to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the various studies in addition to summarizing their results. It then applies leading quantitative models from the literature to arrive at synthesis estimates of the contribution of financial openness to growth for major industrial and emerging-market economies over the past four decades. Finally, the book considers the preliminary evidence on whether the 2007-09 financial crisis constitutes grounds for a major change in the policy verdict on financial openness. As part of that reconsideration, the analysis reviews the causes of the global crisis, as well as its principal events and policy interventions.

The stakes of the poor in trade policy are large: Free trade can help 500 million people escape poverty and inject $200 billion annually into the economies of developing countries, according to author William R. Cline. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the potential for trade liberalization to spur growth and reduce poverty in developing countries. It quantifies the impact on global poverty of industrial-country liberalization, as well as liberalization by the developing countries. Half or more of the annual gains from trade would come from the removal of industrial-country protection against developing-country exports. By removing their trade barriers, industrial countries could convey economic benefits to developing countries worth about twice the amount of their annual development assistance. By helping developing countries grow through trade, moreover, industrial countries could lower costs to consumers for imports and realize other economic efficiencies. The study estimates that free trade could reduce the number of people earning less than $2 per day by about 500 million over 15 years. This would cut the world poverty level by 25 percent. Cline judges that the developing countries were right to risk collapse of the Doha Round at the Cancun ministerial meeting in September 2003 by insisting on much deeper liberalization of agriculture than the industrial countries were then willing to offer. The study calls for a two-track strategy: first, deep multilateral liberalization involving phased but complete elimination of industrial-county protection and deep reduction of protection by at least the middle-income developing countries, albeit on a more gradual schedule; and second, immediate free entry for imports from "high risk" low-income countries (heavily indebted poor countries, least developed countries, and sub-Saharan Africa), coupled with a 10-year tax holiday for direct investment in these countries.

The international debt crisis that erupted in 1982 threatened the world financial system and turned the 1980s into a lost decade for Latin America. But the crisis jolted governments throughout the region into adopting sweeping economic reforms. By the early 1990s inflation was lower, growth was reviving, the major debtors had reached "Brady Plan" workout agreements reducing bank debt in exchange for collateral, and capital was entering the region in unprecedented magnitudes.This study tries to make sense of this historic financial episode and to derive lessons for future policy. Cline first returns to his 1983 projection models that figured importantly in the debate at that time, and reruns them with the benefit of hindsight to see what went wrong (e.g., capital flight) and what went right (e.g., revival of industrial country growth). He provides a critical survey of the voluminous economics literature that emerged from the debt crisis. The study evaluates performance of the evolving international debt strategy, which eventually succeeded brilliantly in preserving international financial stability and restoring debtor access to credit markets but failed to achieve debtor country growth in the 1980s.The study reviews policy reform and Brady plan results for major Latin American countries; provides new analysis of today's debt problems in Russia and Africa; and analyzes the degree of vulnerability of Latin Americas capital market renaissance to such factors as overvalued exchange rates and a resurgence of US interest rates. It concludes with suggestions for institutional change and policy guidelines to help avoid future crises.

First came the financial and debt crisis in Greece, then government financing difficulties and rescue programs in Ireland in 2010 and Portugal in 2011. Before long, Italy and Spain were engulfed by financial contagion as well. Finally in 2012, the European Central Bank pledged to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro area with purchases of government bonds, a step that achieved impressive results, according to William R. Cline in this important new book.One of the world's leading experts on fiscal and debt issues, Cline mobilizes meticulously researched and forceful arguments to trace the history of the euro area debt crisis and makes projections of future debt sustainability. He argues that euro area leaders made the right decision to keep the euro from breaking apart but warns against complacency about the future. Cline contends that troubled European economies should continue their fiscal consolidation but that further debt restructurings for most countries are not called for. Greece is a special case and may need some further debt relief contingent on continued progress on fiscal and structural reform, however. In this landmark study, Cline offers a detailed analysis of the mistakes, successes, and options for Europe as it struggles to overcome its worst economic disaster since World War II.

This study examines the costs and benefits of an aggressive program of global action to limit greenhouse warming. An initial chapter summarizes the scientific issues from the standpoint of an economist. The analysis places heavy emphasis on efforts over a long run of 200 to 300 years, with much greater warming and damages than associated with the conventional benchmark (a doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere). Estimates are presented for economic damages, ranging from agricultural losses and sea-level rise to loss of forests, water scarcity, electricity requirements for air conditioning, and several other major effects. A survey of existing model estimates provides the basis for calculation of costs of limiting emissions of greenhouse gases. After a review of the theory of term discounting in the context of very-long-term environmental issues, the study concludes with a cost-benefit estimate for international action and a discussion of policy measures to mobilize the global response.

The United States has once again entered into a period of large external imbalances. This time the current account deficit, at nearly 6 percent of GDP in 2004, is much larger than in the last episode, when the deficit peaked at about 3.5 percent of GDP in 1987. Moreover, the deficit is on track to become substantially larger over the next several years. This study examines whether the large and growing current account deficit is a problem, and if so, how the problem can be solved. A central policy conclusion of this study is that it is increasingly important that the United States reduce its external current account deficit. This deficit is no longer benign as it arguably was in the late 1990s when it was financing high investment instead of high consumption and large government dissaving.

What began as a relatively localized crisis in Greece in early 2010 soon escalated to envelop Ireland and Portugal. By the second half of 2011, the contagion had spread to the far larger economies of Italy and Spain. In mid-September the Peterson Institute and Bruegel hosted a conference designed to contribute to the formulation of policies that could help resolve the euro area debt crisis. This volume presents the conference papers; several are updated through end-2011. European experts examine the political context in Greece (Loukas Tsoukalis), Ireland (Alan Ahearne), Portugal (Pedro Lourtie), Spain (Guillermo de la Dehesa), Italy (Riccardo Perissich), Germany (Daniela Schwarzer), and France (Zaki Laidi). Lessons from past debt restructurings are then examined by Jeromin Zettelmeyer (economic) and Lee Buchheit (legal). The two editors separately consider the main current policy issues: debt sustainability by country, private sector involvement and contagion, alternative restructuring approaches, how to assemble a large emergency financing capacity, whether the European Central Bank (ECB) should be a lender of last resort, whether joint-liability "eurobonds" would be feasible and desirable, and the implications of a possible break-up of the euro area. The luncheon address by George Soros and a description (by Steven R. Weisman with Silvia B. Merler) of the policy simulation game played on the second day of the conference complete the volume. Involving market participants and experts representing the roles of euro area governments, the ECB, IMF, G-7, and credit rating agencies, the game led to a proposal for leveraging the capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility through arrangements with the ECB.

This study provides alternative estimates of the costs of greenhouse gas abatement through 2050 that would be necessary to limit CO2 atmospheric concentrations to approximately 450 parts per million and limiting warming to 2 DegreesC. Specific estimates are provided for 25 major economies (with the European Union as a single economy). Business as usual baselines are first developed, based on US Department of Energy projections through 2030 and on maintenance of country-specific trends in GDP growth, energy efficiency growth, and carbon-efficiency of energy growth thereafter. The central policy simulation then involves a "Copenhagen Convergence" path, in which major economies meet their Copenhagen (December 2009) pledges for 2020, and thereafter emissions per capita decline along a path that by 2050 results in equal per capita emissions in all countries.Three abatement cost functions are used for calculating the resulting abatement costs: a model based on McKinsey & Co. estimates for 2030; the Nordhaus RICE model cost functions; and a set of summary cost regressions calculated from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF-22) survey of abatement models. It is found that abatement costs should be moderate, reaching about one-fourth to two-thirds of one percent of GDP by 2030 and 1 to 2 percent of GDP by 2050. Costs can be reduced by international trading, but by less than generally perceived. A more ambitious early start on abatement than pledged at Copenhagen could reduce full-period costs. The study calculates corresponding magnitudes of investment for abatement as well as adaptation costs for developing countries, and identifies a benchmark of about $80 billion annually (excluding China) by 2020, lending support to the $100 billion target pledged for industrial country financial support by that year.

For more than a decade, there have been two important trends in the American economy. The first trend has been toward increasing openness of the economy to the international flows of goods, money, people, and ideas. The second has been very slow or even negative growth in real wages and a widening disparity in the distribution of income, particularly between relatively skilled and unskilled workers. Many observers suspect that these two trends are connected: increasing competition from foreign producers, particularly in low-wage developing countries, may have contributed to stagnation in US real wages and a worsening income distribution. These concerns have led to proposals to slow or reverse the internationalization of the American economy in order to bolster real wages, preserve jobs, and prevent a worsening income distribution. The issue is hotly debated among analysts and policymakers. This study will provide a fresh and comprehensive analysis of theory and empirical evidence on the relationships among trade, employment and wages, and income distribution. It will explore the full range of options available to policymakers, including slowing the pace of trade liberalization, providing adjustment assistance to trade-impacted workers, and encouraging investment in human and physical capital.

How will global warming affect developing countries, which rely heavily on agriculture as a source of economic growth? William Cline asserts that developing countries have more at risk, such as their production capacity, than industrial countries as global warming worsens. Using general circulation models, Cline boldly examines 2071-99 to forecast the effects of global warming and its economic impact into the next decade. This detailed study outlines existing studies on climate change; Cline finds the Stern Report for the UK government's estimates most reliable; estimates projected changes in temperature, precipitation, and agricultural capacity; and concludes with policy recommendations. Cline finds that agricultural production in developing countries may fall an average of 16 percent, and if global warming progresses at its current rate, India's agricultural capacity could fall as much as 40 percent. Thus, policymakers should address this phenomenon now before the world's developing countries are adversely and irreversibly affected.